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Abstract
Background: Monitoring the equity of government healthcare subsidies (GHS) is critical for evaluating the performance
of health policy decisions. China’s low-income population encounters barriers in accessing benefits from GHS. This paper
focuses on the distribution of China’s healthcare subsidies among different socio-economic populations and the factors
that affect their equitable distribution. It examines the characteristics of equitable access to benefits in a province of
northeastern China, comparing the equity performance between urban and rural areas.
Methods: Benefit incidence analysis was applied to GHS data from two rounds of China’s National Health Services
Survey (2003 and 2008, N = 27,239) in Heilongjiang province, reflecting the information in 2002 and 2007 respectively.
Concentration index (CI) was used to evaluate the absolute equity of GHSs in outpatient and inpatient healthcare
services. A negative CI indicates disproportionate concentration of GHSs among the poor, while a positive CI indicates
the GHS is pro-rich, a CI of zero indicates perfect equity. In addition, Kakwani index (KI) was used to evaluate
the progressivity of GHSs. A positive KI denotes the GHS is regressive, while a negative value denotes the
GHS is progressive.
Results: CIs for inpatient care in urban and rural residents were 0.2036 and 0.4497 respectively in 2002, and
those in 2007 were 0.4433 and 0.5375. Likewise, CIs for outpatient care are positive in both regions in 2002
and 2007, indicating that both inpatient and outpatient GHSs were pro-rich in both survey periods irrespective of region.
In addition, KIs for inpatient services were −0.3769 (urban) and 0.0576 (rural) in 2002 and those in 2007 were 0.0280 and
0.1868. KIs for outpatient service were -0.4278 (urban) and -0.1257 (rural) in 2002, those in 2007 were −0.2572 and −0.
1501, indicating that equity was improved in GHS in outpatient care in both regions but not in inpatient services.
Conclusions: The benefit distribution of government healthcare subsidies has been strongly influenced by China’s
health insurance schemes. Their compensation policies and benefit packages need reform to improve the benefit equity
between outpatient and inpatient care both in urban and rural areas.
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Background
Achieving universal health coverage (UHC), which aims
to ensure all people have equal access to healthcare ser-
vices according to need without the risk of financial cri-
sis [1], is a main goal for health reform in China. In
reality, patients may not use healthcare services due to
high costs, therefore government healthcare subsidy
(GHS) plays a critical role in lowing costs for health-
care, especially for the poor. Given a limited budget,
the GHS should be provided in an efficient and equit-
ably way. Low-income and disadvantaged populations
are prone to catastrophic payment due to high health-
care out-of-pocket (OOP) costs, therefore should be
placed in the top priorities to receive the government
subsidies. However, recent evidence has shown that it is
often the patients in the upper income groups who reap
the largest benefits from public spending programs in
health sector [2, 3].
The price of medical services and medications is con-
trolled below the market value in China in order to im-
prove affordability of these services [4, 5]. On the other
hand, the government compensates hospitals for defi-
cits between low healthcare prices and high hospital
costs [6]. Government funding accounted for about
60% of revenues in public hospitals at the beginning of
the 1980s, but it had shrunk to 15.69% in 2002 [6].
Since 2003, China has been gradually launching health
sector reforms and has been implementing a specific
policy package. The New Rural Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NCMS) was a 2003 initiative to rebuild rural
health insurance after the collapse of the Rural Co-
operative Medical Scheme (CMS) in the late 1980s. In
Chinese cities in 2007, a new type of urban insurance,
the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI),
was piloted to expand the coverage of the Urban
Workers Basic Medical Insurance (UWBMI), which
only covers the workers in formal sectors such as state-
owned and collective enterprises. Citizens who did not
have a job, such as children, the aged or students, were
allowed to be covered in the URBMI. This basket of
policies made a significant change to the GHS, with
government spending as a proportion of health ex-
penditure increasing from 15.69% in 2002 to 22.31%
in 2007 [6].
Despite GHS increasing by approximately 7% of total
health expenditure from 2002 to 2007, there is no evi-
dence as to whether the distribution of GHS is equitable.
Moreover, the changes and variations in the equitable
distribution of China’s GHS over the years have not been
adequately studied. Therefore, the aims of this study
were two-fold: first, to investigate whether the GHS is
equitably distributed; and second, to compare the equity
of GHSs in different healthcare services between urban
and rural residents from 2002 to 2007.
Methods
Data sources
Data sources comprised two rounds of China’s National
Health Services Survey (NHSS) in Heilongjiang province.
The two rounds were conducted in 2003 and 2008 in
the sampling areas, reflecting the status in 2002 and
2007 respectively. Heilongjiang province, located in the
northeast of China, is a middle-income province in
terms of per capita GDP. Adopting a multi-stage strati-
fied random sampling method, 13 out of 120 cities and
counties in Heilongjiang province were randomly se-
lected in the survey. In every city or county, eight com-
munities or villages were selected according to regional
economic level and geographic distribution. From these
communities or villages, 33 households were then ran-
domly selected. Each member of the selected families
was interviewed by the trained data collectors. Finally,
11,572 individuals in 2003 and 15,817 individuals in
2008 were effectively collected in the survey. This study
was approved by the Academic Research Ethics Com-
mittee of Nanjing Medical University. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants.
The survey contains extensive information about
household socio-economic and demographic characteris-
tics, including household expenditure, urban–rural clas-
sification, number of family members, gender, age,
education attainment and working status of household
members, household goods and consumption. House-
hold expenditure per equivalent adult was used as the
measure of living standard in our study. The equivalent
adults were calculated using the following formula:
AE ¼ Aþ 0:5Kð Þ0:75
where A is the number of adults in the household and K
represents the number of children (0–14 years) [7].
Per capita GHS was computed from two sources. One
was from the survey, recording the information from the
interviewees on healthcare utilization, such as outpatient
visit, length of hospital stay, level of healthcare facility
(municipal hospital, county hospital, hospital of trad-
itional Chinese medicine, township hospital, community
health center, etc.). The number of inpatient days was
reported for a 12-month recall period and outpatient
visits for the previous two weeks. The other source of
data, which was collected from the local health financial
yearbook, was used to calculate the cost of government
subsidies, outpatient visits, inpatient days, and revenue
at each level of healthcare facility. Since the subsidies
were not disaggregated by service type within healthcare
facilities, we computed the ratio of outpatient to in-
patient revenue as the proportion of subsidies between
outpatient and inpatient services. Unit subsidy at the
level of healthcare facility was calculated by dividing the
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total service-specific subsidies at different levels of facil-
ities by the sum of outpatient visits and the number of
inpatient days. The subsidy for each individual was the
quantity of healthcare utilization multiplied by the unit
subsidy at each level of facility.
Data analysis
Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA) with concentration index
(CI) and Kakwani index (KI) was used to measure the ex-
tent of equity in this study. BIA provides an important
insight of the assessment of distributional impacts of pub-
lic spending by combining data on household level with
hospital-related costs. It evaluates the distribution of gov-
ernment subsidies for healthcare among different groups
in the population, and in particular, among the different
income groups [8].
The concentration curve and its related CI was used
to evaluate the degree of income-related inequity in the
distribution of a health variable. Figure 1 displays the
conceptual concentration curve for government subsidy
on healthcare across individuals and their income. The
y-axis is the cumulative percentage of the health subsidy
and the x-axis represents the cumulative percentage of
the population, ranked by living standards, beginning
with the poorest and ending with the richest. The CI is
calculated as twice the area between the concentration
curve, L1, and the line of equality (Le, the 45-degree line
running from the bottom-left corner to the top-right).
The CI compares a concentration curve with the 45-
degree line. If the concentration curve lies above the 45-
degree line, the distribution is determined to be pro-
poor, and if below, the distribution is pro-rich. Pro-poor
indicated that the subsidies close the absolute gap in
welfare between the rich and poor, while pro-rich indi-
cates an increasing gap [9]. These are called strongly
progressive and strongly regressive, respectively. A nega-
tive value of CI, where the concentration curve lies
above the 45-degree line, indicates disproportionate con-
centration of government health subsidies among the
poor. The further the curve is above the line, the more
concentrated the subsidy is amongst the poor and the
higher the value of the CI, and vice versa.
However, the CI is only appropriate if the distribu-
tional goal is to close the absolute gap in welfare be-
tween the rich and poor and it does not take into
account the ability-to-pay (ATP) on the relative scale, i.e.
progressivity of GHS is not measured by CI. The KI is
the most widely used measure of progressivity in health
care financing [10]. The KI evaluates the relative gap of
subsidy between the poor and rich, and is defined as
twice the area between the Lorenz curve (L2) and the
concentration curve for GHS (Fig. 1). The L2 represents
the relationship between the cumulative percentage of
living standard and the cumulative percentage of the
population. If the objective is to close the relative gap,
the subsidy should be inequality-reducing (weakly pro-
gressive), which requires that the share of subsidy re-
ceived by the poor exceeds its share of living standard.
In this case, the subsidy concentration curve lies above
the L2 [9]. With the L2, the Gini coefficient of living
standard, defined as twice the area between the L2 and
the 45-degree line, can be calculated. Furthermore, the
KI can be calculated from the CI and Gini coefficient as
the difference between the CI and Gini coefficient.
Therefore:
πk ¼ 2
Z1
0
L2−L1½ dp
πk ¼ 2
Z1
0
Le−L1½ dp−2
Z1
0
Le−L2½ dp
πk ¼ C−G
where C is the concentration index for government sub-
sidy on healthcare, and G refers to the Gini coefficient.
The KI, πk, is calculated by the difference between the
CI and the Gini coefficient, denoting the degree of pro-
gressivity of government health subsidy. Despite that
there are several methods for computing the variance of
CI [11], convenient regression method has been used in
our study. Given the relationship between variance and
Fig. 1 Conceptual concentration curve for government subsidies on
healthcare and income. The figure displays the conceptual concentration
curve for government subsidies on healthcare and per capita income.
The concentration curve plots the cumulative percentage of health
subsidy (y-axis) against the cumulative percentage of the population
(x-axis), ranked by living standard from the poorest to the richest. It is
measured by CI, as twice the area between the concentration curve, L1,
and the line of equality (the 45° line running from the bottom-left corner
to the top-right, Le). The Lorenz curve (L2) represents the relationship
between the cumulative percentage of per capita income and the
cumulative percentage of the population, which is measured by the
Gini coefficient
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convenient regression, an equivalent estimate of the CI
can be obtained from an ordinary least squares regres-
sion of a transformation of GHS of interest on the frac-
tional rank in the living standards distribution [10]. In
the context of GHS, it should be inequity-reducing, i.e.,
the GHS concentration curve dominates the Lorenz
curve. On the contrary, if the GHS concentration curve
is dominated by the Lorenz curve, the GHS is not equit-
ably distributed. Put it in another way, a positive value
of KI (πk > 0) indicates the GHS is pro-rich, while a
negative value (πk < 0) implies the GHS is pro-poor. In
the case of proportionality, the KI equals to 0 (πk = 0).
Moreover, some studies using CI method for other geo-
graphic areas within China help to evaluate and under-
stand the extent of health care inequity [12, 13].
In addition, a dominance test was performed. To estab-
lish whether the subsidy on healthcare reduces inequity,
in the sense that lower income individuals receive a
greater share of subsidy than the wealthy, as compared to
their living standards, a test was conducted to assess
whether the concentration curve dominates (lies above)
the L2 of household expenditure. For the dominance tests,
standard errors of the ordinates of curves and of differ-
ences in ordinates were computed, allowing for depend-
ence between curves where appropriate [14]. A multiple
comparison approach to testing was adopted, with the null
defined as curves being indistinguishable [15].
Results
Table 1 summarizes the demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics in each income quintile of the
study population. It was found that the insurance
coverage in rural areas was lower than that in cities in
2002, while the coverage had become much higher than
in the urban areas by 2007. In 2002, a greater proportion
of urban residents received GHS on both outpatient and
inpatient care than rural residents. In addition, the OOP
payment for inpatient care in urban residents was higher
than that in rural residents, but not for outpatient care.
In 2007, there were still a larger proportion of urban res-
idents receiving GHS on outpatient care, but not in in-
patient care. The OOPs, however, were all higher in
urban residents in both inpatient and outpatient care.
Quintile shares of the subsidies on outpatient and in-
patient care are shown in Table 2. In addition, total sub-
sidies across urban and rural populations for 2002 and
2007 were also summarized. The benefit incidence of
government subsidy was presented using benefit distri-
bution, CI and KI. In 2002 and 2007, the values of CI
were all positive, suggesting that a greater proportion of
the subsidy was allocated to the rich than to the poor in
both outpatient and inpatient services. In the same re-
gion, in a particular year, the value of CI for outpatient
care is smaller than for inpatient service. The result indi-
cates that compared to outpatient care, pro-rich bias is
obviously found in the subsidy distribution of inpatient
care among all the regions examined.
In 2007, the economic gap between the rich and poor
narrowed in both urban and rural areas as indicated by
the decreasing Gini coefficient. Within a similar eco-
nomic context, the pro-rich trend of government subsid-
ies for healthcare differed between outpatient and
inpatient care in both urban and rural regions. In cities,
the CI value increased over this period in both
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of sampling data and socioeconomic characteristics by per capita expenditure quintiles
Year Income
quintiles
per capita
expenditure a,b
Insurance rate (%) % of outpatients
receiving imbursement
% of inpatients
receiving imbursement
Outpatient OOP a,b Inpatient OOP a,b
urban rural urban rural urban rural urban rural urban rural urban rural
2002 Q1 4059.86 3648.69 18.89 5.04 17.14 2.78 9.52 18.75 535.21 232.73 2339.55 575.42
Q2 6856.98 5650.99 30.76 7.85 21.74 7.32 23.81 9.09 257.08 472.83 2317.79 1565.06
Q3 10359.93 7572.59 36.42 9.14 29.41 7.46 44.74 11.11 314.89 540.44 3050.69 1857.69
Q4 16039.95 10004.23 48.61 12.87 24.68 5.19 56.52 6.38 470.98 808.41 3407.48 2764.67
Q5 41451.14 16793.03 52.96 13.92 25.71 3.85 54.00 4.08 542.62 1065.09 5779.82 2776.86
total 15747.00 8731.38 37.51 9.75 24.66 5.35 43.75 8.00 423.76 700.00 4243.90 2283.90
2007 Q1 6660.52 6648.07 26.79 84.96 11.76 40.00 22.22 75.00 271.82 255.04 3315.79 1857.33
Q2 9991.07 9728.19 36.86 89.19 14.67 19.47 31.03 72.73 353.45 247.77 2763.45 2283.42
Q3 13350.52 12281.31 45.07 89.66 40.30 25.66 43.59 77.11 415.12 295.48 3120.64 2591.91
Q4 18358.27 15648.48 49.59 89.23 30.43 26.61 49.18 72.90 572.21 217.23 3488.25 2346.19
Q5 37131.60 26416.39 69.74 93.64 49.51 25.19 56.32 67.23 533.02 322.15 10074.57 4593.18
total 17094.69 14145.80 45.96 89.34 31.61 26.43 46.58 71.62 452.49 269.54 5761.21 3213.14
Data source: author’s calculations of household surveys
aAll expenditures are presented in CNY
bAll 2002 nominal prices have been adjusted to real prices in 2007 according to China’s Consumer Price Index (CPI)
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Table 2 Distribution of government healthcare subsidy (GHS) by income quintiles, concentration index (CI), and Kakwani index (KI)
Year Area Income quintiles Living standard Outpatient GHS Inpatient GHS Total GHS
2002 Urban (A) poorest 20% 4.93% 13.75% 11.33% 13.11%
2nd poorest 8.51% 14.58% 14.43% 14.54%
3rd 12.69% 23.26% 24.89% 23.70%
2nd richest 19.64% 24.24% 18.74% 22.78%
richest 20% 54.23% 24.17% 30.61% 25.88%
Gini/CI 0.5805b 0.1527b 0.2036a 0.1662b
(SE) (0.0092) (0.0549) (0.0732) (0.0469)
KI - −0.4278a −0.3769a −0.4143a
(SE) (0.0559) (0.0739) (0.0480)
Dominance test
-against 450 line D - D - D -
-against Lorenz curve D + D + D +
Rural (B) poorest 20% 8.05% 10.76% 7.43% 9.59%
2nd poorest 12.41% 11.77% 11.03% 11.51%
3rd 16.45% 19.42% 17.35% 18.69%
2nd richest 22.11% 30.04% 17.46% 25.64%
richest 20% 40.98% 28.01% 46.74% 34.56%
Gini/CI 0.3921b 0.2664a 0.4497a 0.3305b
(SE) (0.0041) (0.0924) (0.1373) (0.0778)
KI - −0.1257a 0.0576a −0.0616a
(SE) (0.0924) (0.1371) (0.0777)
Dominance test
-against 450 line D - D - D -
-against Lorenz curve none none none
2007 Urban (C) poorest 20% 7.70% 13.36% 8.77% 10.77%
2nd poorest 11.88% 20.60% 8.72% 13.89%
3rd 16.06% 14.91% 13.76% 14.26%
2nd richest 21.86% 21.83% 27.41% 24.98%
richest 20% 42.51% 29.30% 41.34% 36.10%
Gini/CI 0.4154b 0.1581a 0.4433a 0.3193b
(SE) (0.0049) (0.0513) (0.0789) (0.0513)
KI - −0.2572a 0.0280a −0.0961a
(SE) (0.0515) (0.0790) (0.0514)
Dominance test
-against 450 line none D - D -
-against Lorenz curve D + none none
Rural (D) poorest 20% 9.03% 13.73% 5.36% 8.88%
2nd poorest 13.31% 16.42% 7.68% 11.36%
3rd 17.07% 18.57% 16.97% 17.65%
2nd richest 22.10% 22.40% 20.95% 21.56%
richest 20% 38.49% 28.88% 49.04% 40.55%
Gini/CI 0.3507b 0.2006a 0.5375a 0.3957b
(SE) (0.0032) (0.0506) (0.0652) (0.0449)
KI - −0.1501a 0.1868a 0.0450a
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outpatient (0.1527 to 0.1581) and inpatient (0.2036 to
0.4433) care. In rural areas, on the other hand, the
CI value of outpatient care decreased (0.2664 to
0.2006) while that of inpatient care increased (0.4497
to 0.5375). In other words, a relatively higher health-
care subsidy was allocated to rural outpatient care in
2007 than in 2002.
All the KIs for outpatient services were negative in
2002 and 2007, indicating that the subsidies to outpa-
tients was distributed progressively to the ATP. With re-
gard to inpatient care, the KI values were all positive
except for the case of urban inpatient care in 2002.
These results suggest that government subsidies on out-
patient care reduced inequality, while the subsidies on
inpatient care did not. Results showing the plots of
Lorenz curve and the concentration curve are presented
in Fig. 2. This provides a visual representation of the
progressivity of government subsidies on healthcare.
A comparison between urban and rural areas shows
that in both years, 2002 (row A-B) and 2007 (row C-D),
the differences in the subsidies were negative (for outpa-
tients −0.3021 and inpatients −0.4346 in 2002, and out-
patients −0.1071 and inpatients −0.1589 in 2007). This
implies that in terms of the inequality-reducing effect,
subsidies to urban healthcare institutes had a better per-
formance than that in rural institutes in both years.
In addition, a comparison of the differences between
the subsidies in 2002 and 2007 showed that in the urban
areas (row C-A), the KI values were positive for both
outpatients (0.1706) and for inpatients (0.4049), while in
the rural areas (row D-B) it was negative for outpatients
(−0.0244) and positive for inpatients (0.1292). This find-
ing suggests that the inequality-reducing effect had
worsened between 2002 and 2007 in inpatient services
and urban outpatient services. While for outpatient ser-
vices in rural areas, the relative gap had decreased.
Discussion
This study has determined that Chinese government
subsidies on healthcare have been equitably distributed
in outpatient services but “not yet” to the inpatient ser-
vices. All GHS KIs for inpatient services were positive in
both urban and rural areas in 2007. This indicates that
the government health subsidies were concentrated on
the rich relative to their ATPs. On the other hand, GHS
KIs for outpatient services were all negative in 2007,
suggesting the GHS was pro-poor after adjusting for the
ATP. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the
equity of GHS has improved from 2002 to 2007 in out-
patient services in rural areas but not in outpatient ser-
vices in urban areas nor all inpatient services in both
rural and urban areas. Equity in GHS on inpatients ser-
vices was not improved based on the increased KI values
both in urban (KI increased by 0.4049 from 2002 to
2007) and rural areas (KI increased by 0.1292). However,
in rural outpatient care, GHS was inequality-reducing as
indicated by the decreased KI value (KI decreased by
0.0244 from 2002 to 2007).
In 2002, the proportion of patients that used the insur-
ance scheme was on a low level in both cities and vil-
lages. In addition, health insurance coverage in villages
was lower than in cities in 2002, whereas by 2007 the
coverage had become much higher than in the urban
areas (Table 1). The records kept by NCMS showed that
the participation rate was similar amongst the income
quintiles in 2007, on the contrary, the participation rate
Table 2 Distribution of government healthcare subsidy (GHS) by income quintiles, concentration index (CI), and Kakwani index (KI)
(Continued)
(SE) (0.0506) (0.0650) (0.0447)
Dominance test
-against 450 line D - D - D -
-against Lorenz curve none D - none
Inequality difference Δ(Urban–rural) 2002 (A-B) - −0.3021 −0.4346 −0.3527
Dominance test none none none
2007 (C-D) - −0.1071 −0.1589 −0.1411
Dominance test none none none
Δ(2007–2002) Urban (C-A) - 0.1706 0.4049 0.3182
Dominance test none none none
Rural (D-B) - −0.0244 0.1292 0.1065
Dominance test none none none
None indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable at the 5 percent significance level
D+/D- indicates concentration curve dominates (is dominated by) the Lorenz curve or concentration curve in one year or area and dominates (is dominated by)
the other in another year or area
aSignificant at 0.05
bSignificant at 0.01
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of the urban health insurance increased with the level of
income. This difference can largely be attributed to the
insurance policy entitlement of UWBMI, which is the
major part of urban health insurance. Only citizens with
stable jobs were eligible to be insured by UWBMI, al-
though after 2007, migrant workers and other informal
workers were allowed to be insured. As a result, the
UWBMI rate was strongly associated with income status
and by the variation in the proportion of patients receiv-
ing reimbursement.
From 2002 to 2007, the proportion of rural residents
who used health insurance increased in all income quin-
tiles, whilst the proportion only increased in the middle-
and high-income quintiles in urban areas (Table 1).
Consequently, the expanding coverage and the propor-
tion requiring compensation, improved the access to
and utilization of the healthcare, resulting in an in-
creased chance to receive government subsidies, espe-
cially for the poor and vulnerable groups in rural areas.
This divergence of the equity of the government health
subsidies between urban and rural areas could be ex-
plained by the ‘law of inverse equity’, in which the rich
receive more of the benefits of publicly provided services
when coverage is low, but as coverage increases, the
poor start benefiting equally [16].
The difference in GHS in urban and rural areas may
be explained by the difference in insurance coverage and
in the proportion of patients receiving compensation.
However, we found that KI for inpatient care increased
from 2002 to 2007 in rural areas while for outpatient
care it decreased over the same period. A possible ex-
planation for the difference observed between outpatient
and inpatient care in villages and why the equity for gov-
ernment health subsidy was exclusively improved in out-
patient care in rural areas, follows.
The divergence of equity between outpatient and in-
patient care might be attributed to the compensation pol-
icy and benefit package of NCMS. In order to achieve
UHC, an important policy goal of China’s healthcare re-
form, it is significant that every Chinese, irrespective of so-
cial standing, not only has access to basic medical care but
also gets financial protection. Thus, a key objective of
NCMS is to broaden coverage for more rural resident and
ensure breadth of UHC. However, other key components
of UHC, such as the depth and height of health insurance
cover, appear to have received little attention. Since the
funding of NCMS was administered and implemented at
the county level, fragmentation occurred which limited
the scope for risk pooling and made financial protection
underprovided. In addition, county officials who were
financially responsible for safely managing the funds
had to decide between updating benefit packages or
expanding population coverage. Based on the policy
priority of covering more of the population, NCMS
was designed for comprehensive population coverage
at the expense of appropriate financial protection.
Fig. 2 Concentration curve for government subsidies on health care and income. Actual concentration curve for government subsidies on
healthcare (including outpatient, inpatient, and total healthcare) and L2 in years 2002 and 2007 for both urban and rural areas
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Although NCMS deductibles were not so high that
the insured could not get reimbursed, the ceiling was
also very low. Additionally, the cost sharing and fees
were very high for rural patients [17, 18]. Also, the
insurance scheme indicates that high-expenditure dis-
eases were compensated to a very low level of reim-
bursement, while low-medical-expenditure ailments,
which usually require outpatient services, were com-
pensated to a relatively high level of reimbursement.
Involvement in the scheme was directly related to the
level of OOP payment. OOP expenditures for rural
outpatient care were decreased by a significant magnitude
between 2002–2007, whilst other types of OOP payments
were increased and remained at a high level (Table 1).
Healthcare utilization for the rural population will in-
crease with lower user fees, and the poor who need med-
ical services will begin to benefit from government health
spending. For these reasons, it was exclusively the rural
outpatient services that improved as a result of equity of
government health subsidies.
Another difficulty faced with the government health
scheme was due to the financial burdens faced by pa-
tients. This burden affected patients’ responsiveness to
the care offered as outpatient or inpatient, and influ-
enced their behavior in seeking care and in making
hospital-related choices [19, 20]. Their response was not
made according to the healthcare need, but by the com-
pensation policy of the insurance scheme. As a result,
the reimbursement policies of NCMS have changed in
an attempt to encourage individuals, especially those
poor who need hospitalization care, to seek outpatient
care as a replacement therapy. For example, many rural
patients treated illness with Chinese traditional medicine
as prescribed in outpatient services. These accounted for
as much as 40% of all healthcare delivered in China [21].
For this reason, benefit distribution for rural outpatient
care was increased to the poor.
Our study has several limitations that should be ad-
dressed. First, patients that have the same ATP would
be assigned to the different fractional ranks, thus CI
estimates might be unstable and inconsistent [22]. In
our study, the patients that have the same ATP were
ranked according to their alphabetic order and house-
hold number, but a stata module, CONCINDC, is a
better method to calculate consistent and replicable
estimates of CI [23]. Second, the classification of
living standards was based on the household expend-
iture. Despite that expenditure has been recognized as
a preferred measure of living standard [10], self-
reported household expenditure might be inaccurate
due to recall bias. Consequently, it should be ac-
knowledged that our study was limited to the use of
self-reported household expenditure to classify living
standards.
Conclusions
Unlike health financing equity, BIA focuses on whether
or not health resources allocated by authorities were
evenly distributed among income groups. The present
study reflects the overall picture of unequal government
health subsidies. With the exception of rural outpatient
care in 2007, greater subsidies on various types of
healthcare were concentrated on the rich and did not
show the inequality-reducing effect in different regions
in the years that were studied. However, equity of the
rural outpatient benefit was partly driven by the fact that
some people were not able to afford hospital expenses
and had to choose outpatient care. This patient care-
seeking behavior was strongly influenced by China’s
current health insurance scheme. With more than 96%
of the population having been covered by health insur-
ances, it is therefore indicated that authorities should re-
design the present insurance schemes, especially the
compensation policies, to account for patient’s actual
needs, both in outpatient and inpatient care.
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